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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
This case marks the third round of litigation between C. 
Delores Tucker, a former state official and a community 
leader, and the record companies and performers 
responsible for what is known as "gangsta rap."1 Since 
1993, C. Delores Tucker has crusaded against gangsta-rap 
lyrics, which, she asserts, "grossly malign black women, 
degrade the unthinking young black artists who cr eate 
[gansta rap], pander pornography to our innocent young 
children, hold black people universally up to ridicule and 
contempt, and corrupt its vast audience of listeners, white 
and black, throughout the world." App. at 2322. Mrs. 
Tucker has taken her message to shareholder meetings of 
major corporations to pressure them to divest their 
holdings in record companies that pr oduce gangsta rap; 
she has also addressed Congress to ur ge that steps be 
taken to "curb and control the proliferation of vile, 
demeaning pornographic and misogynistic music." Id. 
 
Mrs. Tucker's efforts caught the attention of the rap 
industry, and in August 1995, Interscope Recor ds, Inc., 
filed suit against her in the United States District Court for 
the Central District of California (Tucker I), alleging that she 
had induced a breach of contract between Death Row 
Records, Inc., and Interscope. Interscope and Death Row 
voluntarily withdrew that suit. Then, in July 1997, Mrs. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. "Gansta rap" has been described as "a form of hip hop music that 
became the genre's dominant style in the 1990s, a reflection and product 
of the often violent lifestyle of American inner cities afflicted with 
poverty 
and the dangers of drug use and drug dealing. The r omanticization of 
the outlaw at the centre of much of gangsta rap appealed to rebellious 
suburbanites as well as to those who had firsthand experience of the the 
harsh realities of the ghetto. Encyclopedia Britannica, "Gangsta Rap" 
<http://www.britannica.com/bcom/eb/article/3/ 
0,5716,128693+1,00.html>. Prominent gangsta rap groups are described 
as "present[ing] tales of gangs and violence," "offer[ing] hard-hitting 
depictions of crack-cocaine related crime," and featuring "a marriage of 
languid beats and murderous gang mentality." Id. 
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Tucker and her husband, William Tucker , filed a complaint 
in the United States District Court for the Easter n District 
of Pennsylvania (Tucker II), alleging that the lyrics in two 
songs by deceased rapper Tupac Shakur on an album 
called All Eyez On Me had attacked Mrs. Tucker using 
"sexually explicit messages, offensively coarse language and 
lewd and indecent words" and that she had r eceived death 
threats because of her activities. Named as defendants were 
Shakur's estate; Interscope, which had produced Shakur's 
album; and four other companies, including T ime-Warner, 
Inc., which allegedly maintained a financial inter est in 
Interscope. Asserting claims for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, slander, and invasion of privacy, Mrs. 
Tucker sought damages for medical expenses and mental 
injury. In paragraph 50, the Complaint alleged that her 
"husband, William Tucker has as a r esult of his wife's 
injuries, suffered a loss of advice, companionship and 
consortium." Tucker II Compl. P 50 (emphasis added), App. 
at 23. Loss of consortium means loss by one spouse of 
"whatever of aid, assistance, comfort, and society [one 
spouse] would be expected to render or to bestow upon [the 
other]." Hopkins v. Blanco, 302 A.2d 855, 856 (Pa. Super. 
1973), aff 'd, 320 A.2d 139 (Pa. 1974). Loss of consortium 
includes, but is not limited to, "impairment of capacity for 
sexual intercourse." Restatement (Second) of Torts S 693(1) 
(1977); see also W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on 
Torts 931 (5th ed. 1984). 
 
The filing of the Tuckers' lawsuit spawned numer ous 
articles that focused on the "loss of consortium" claim. 
Among them was an article printed by the Philadelphia 
Daily News on August 2, 1997, in which the lawyer 
representing Shakur's estate, Richar d Fischbein, was 
quoted as saying: "[I]t is hard for me to conceive how these 
lyrics could destroy her sex life . . . but we can only wait for 
the proof to be revealed in court." App. at 30. Following the 
Philadelphia Daily News article, wire and news services 
throughout the country picked up the story, and many of 
them quoted or paraphrased Fischbein's comment 
interpreting the Tuckers' claim as seeking compensation for 
damage to their sex life. 
 
On August 20, 1997, Newsweek reporter Johnnie L. 
Roberts telephoned the Tuckers' attorney, Richard C. 
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Angino, regarding an upcoming Newsweek  story about the 
lawsuit. According to Angino, he informed Roberts that, 
although loss of consortium could mean loss of sex in some 
cases, it did not mean that in this case. See  App. at 645. 
Roberts disputes Angino's account of this conversation. 
 
On August 26, 1997, Roberts interviewed Fischbein in 
connection with the story. Roberts's notes show that 
Fischbein told him that one of the claims in the Tuckers' 
complaint involved interference with sexual relations. In 
addition to speaking with Fischbein and Angino, Roberts 
read the complaint and looked up the definition of 
consortium before writing his article. On September 1, 
1997, Newsweek printed an article written by Roberts and 
entitled "Grabbing at a Dead Star." The article stated: "Even 
C. Delores Tucker, the gangsta rap foe, wants a chunk [of 
Tupac Shakur's estate]. She and her husband claim that a 
lyrical attack by Tupac iced their sex life." App. at 90. 
Although the article did not mention the conversation 
between Roberts and Angino, it did quote Fischbein as 
commenting as follows regarding the loss-of-consortium 
claim: "I can't wait to hear the testimony on that subject." 
Id. 
 
The next day, the Tuckers filed an amended complaint in 
Tucker II (the "First Amended Complaint"), which included 
an additional claim against Fischbein for making"false and 
misleading statements regarding the claim herein, through 
published statements that C. Delores Tuckerfiled suit 
because of a `loss of her sex life.' " App. at 1711. The 
amended complaint was served on Fischbein and the other 
defendants, including Time-Warner , Inc. 
 
On September 12, after he was served with the First 
Amended Complaint, Fischbein gave an interview to Time 
reporter Belinda Luscombe concerning the Tuckers' case. 
Luscombe stated in deposition that Fischbein had told her 
that "this was a lawsuit about emotional distr ess and one 
of the things affected were [sic] her sexual relationship with 
her husband." See App. at 2197. T ime printed Luscombe's 
article, entitled "Shakur Booty," on September 15, 1997. 
See App. at 34. Although the article did not quote 
Fischbein, Luscombe admitted in her deposition that she 
based the article solely on her interview with Fischbein and 
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on other articles, most of which appear to be derived from 
Fischbein's initial comments to the press in early August. 
 
On October 1, 1997, the Tuckers filed the complaint that 
is the subject of this action (Tucker III). The complaint 
alleges that Fischbein, Time, Inc. ("T ime"), and Newsweek, 
Inc. ("Newsweek") defamed the Tuckers by characterizing 
their loss of consortium claim in Tucker II as a claim for 
loss of sexual relations. Specifically, the Tuckers maintain 
that Mrs. Tucker's reputation as a moral leader was 
compromised when Time and Newsweek printed Fischbein's 
characterization of her suit as one to recover for the lyrics' 
effect on her sex life. 
 
Time, Newsweek, and Fischbein each moved for summary 
judgment, and the District Court granted their motions, 
holding that the statements in question were not capable of 
a defamatory meaning and, alternatively, that the Tuckers, 
who conceded that they were "public figur es," could not 
adequately prove that the defendants acted with"actual 
malice." Although the defendants had also contended that 
the Tuckers could not prove that the statements were false, 
the Court made no explicit holding on that question. This 
appeal followed. 
 
I. 
 
"[A]lthough a defamation suit has profound First 
Amendment implications, it is fundamentally a state cause 
of action." McDowell v. Paiewonsky, 769 F .2d 942, 945 (3d 
Cir. 1985). In this appeal, our first duty is to resolve a 
question of state law, i.e., whether the Tuckers adduced 
sufficient evidence to show that the statements in question 
were defamatory under Pennsylvania law. If the plaintiffs 
satisfied that burden, we must then deter mine if the First 
Amendment precludes recovery. See Steaks Unlimited, Inc. 
v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264, 270 (3d Cir . 1980). 
 
Under Pennsylvania law, a defamation plaintif f bears the 
burden to show: 
 
       (1) The defamatory character of the communication. 
 
       (2) Its publication by the defendant. 
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       (3) Its application to the plaintiff. 
 
       (4) The understanding by the recipient of its 
       defamatory meaning. 
 
       (5) The understanding by the recipient of it as 
       intended to be applied to the plaintiff. 
 
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 8343(a) (1998). Under 
Pennsylvania law, the court must decide at the outset 
whether a statement is capable of defamatory meaning. See 
Thomas Merton Ctr. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp. , 442 A.2d 213, 
215-16 (Pa. 1981). If the court determines that the 
statement is capable of a defamatory meaning, the jury 
must then decide whether the recipient actually understood 
the statement to be defamatory. See Corabi v. Curtis Publ'g 
Co., 273 A.2d 899, 904 (Pa. 1971). 
 
A statement is defamatory if "it tends so to har m the 
reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of 
the community or to deter third persons fr om associating or 
dealing with him." Id. (citing Birl v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 
167 A.2d 472, 476 (Pa. 1960)). Accord Restatement (Second) 
of Torts S 559. A court must examine the meaning of the 
allegedly defamatory statement in context, see Beckman v. 
Dunn, 419 A.2d 583, 586 (Pa. Super. 1981), and must 
evaluate "the effect [it] is fairly calculated to produce, the 
impression it would naturally engender, in the minds of the 
average persons among whom it is intended to cir culate." 
Corabi, 273 A.2d at 907. While it is not enough that a 
statement is embarrassing or annoying, see Bogash v. 
Elkins, 176 A.2d 677, 678 (Pa. 1962), a court should not 
dismiss a complaint unless it is "clear that the publication 
is incapable of a defamatory meaning." V itteck v. 
Washington Broad. Co., 389 A.2d 1197, 1200-01 (Pa. Super. 
1978). 
 
The statements at issue here were the following: 
 
       (1) The statement in Time's September 22, 1997, 
       article, "Shakur Booty," that "[t]he prize for the most 
       bizarre suit . . . goes to anti-rap warrior C. Delores 
       Tucker, who claims that remarks made about her on 
       Shakur's Album All Eyez on Me caused her so much 
       distress that she and her husband have not been 
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       able to have sex. She wants $10 million." App. at 
       1634. 
 
       (2) The statement in Newsweek's September 1, 1997, 
       article, "Grabbing at a Dead Star," that "[Mrs. Tucker] 
       and her husband claim that a lyrical attack by 
       Tupac iced their sex life." App. at 90. 
 
       (3) Fischbein's comment, quoted in an August 2, 1997, 
       Philadelphia Daily News article, that "[i]t's hard for 
       me to conceive how these lyrics could destroy her 
       sex life . . . but we can only wait for the pr oof to be 
       revealed at trial." App. at 29. 
 
       (4) Fischbein's August 20, 1997, statement to 
       Newsweek columnist Johnnie L. Roberts that Mrs. 
       Tucker was bringing suit, in part, to recover for 
       damage to her sex life, and his statement, quoted in 
       the Newsweek article, that "I can't wait to hear her 
       testimony on that subject." App. at 31. 
 
       (5) Fischbein's statement to Belinda Luscombe of Time 
       that Tucker II "was brought for emotional distress 
       and that part of that was that . . . her sexual 
       relationship with her husband was affected." App. at 
       2197. 
 
The District Court held that none of these statements 
could have a defamatory meaning. The Court concluded 
that, although the statements might be annoying or 
embarrassing, they could not support a cause of action for 
defamation. The Court stated: "There is a vast difference 
between being annoyed and/or embarrassed on the one 
hand, and being disgraced and ridiculed to the extent that 
one's reputation is harmed and lower ed in the estimation of 
the community, on the other." Dist. Ct. Op. at 6. 
 
We cannot agree with the District Court's analysis. 
Statements considerably milder than or comparable to 
those at issue here have been held by the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court to be capable of a defamatory meaning. For 
example, in Birl v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 167 A.2d 472 (Pa. 
1960), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a 
statement that an employee quit without notice was 
capable of a defamatory meaning because recipients could 
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conclude that the employee lacked honor and integrity "and 
was not a person to be relied upon insofar as his business 
dealings were concerned." Id. at 476. In Cosgrove Studio & 
Camera Shop v. Pane, 182 A.2d 751 (Pa. 1962), the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that an advertisement 
was capable of a defamatory meaning because it implied 
that a competitor had bad business practices and might 
lead a recipient to question the competitor's integrity. Id. at 
754. 
 
Reading the statements at issue in this case in context 
and looking at the impression that they wer e likely to 
engender in the minds of the average reader , we conclude 
that each is capable of a defamatory meaning. Mrs. Tucker 
has led a campaign against the immorality of gangsta rap 
and those who profit from it. The statements made by the 
defendants--to the effect that Mrs. Tucker and her 
husband brought a $10 million lawsuit because Shakur's 
lyrics damaged their sex life--carry numer ous disparaging 
implications. Because of the inherent implausibility of the 
idea that lyrics alone could cause millions of dollars of 
damage to a couple's sexual relationship, the statements 
were capable of making the Tuckers look insincere, 
excessively litigious, avaricious, and perhaps unstable. 
Furthermore, the statements tended to suggest that the 
Tuckers are hypocritical, that after condemning the gangsta 
rap industry for profiting from por nography, the Tuckers 
were only too willing to open up their own sex life for public 
inspection in order to reap a pecuniary gain. In the more 
colloquial language used by the defendants themselves, the 
statements suggested that the Tuckers were"[g]rabbing [a]t 
a [d]ead [s]tar['s]" "[b]ooty" and were willing to take the 
witness stand at trial and publicly provide the testimony 
about their sex lives that Fischbein "[couldn't] wait to hear." 
Such statements were capable of lowering the Tuckers' 
reputation in the eyes of the community and of causing 
others to avoid associating with them. 
 
It is worth noting that, not only were the defendants' 
statements capable of a defamatory meaning, but the 
Tuckers adduced evidence that their reputations were in 
fact adversely affected. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
S 8343(a)(4) (requiring plaintiff to prove that the recipient 
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understood the statement as defamatory). In a Philadelphia 
Daily News article dated August 6, 1997, the author stated: 
"I also appreciate how some people felt betrayed when she 
filed a $10 million suit that has trivialized her and her 
movement. For a week now, even some of her most 
consistent supporters have been questioning her motives 
and snickering over the suit's allegation that her sex life 
has been ruined by a couple of Tupac Shakur raps." App. 
at 2143. An August 17, 1997, Chicago Sun-T imes article 
noted: "[I]n my eyes Tucker has suffer ed a self-inflicted 
blow to her credibility. . . . Seems to me the real 
humiliation comes when a woman who has fought har d 
against gangsta rap makes the very personal and 
embarrassing claim that a couple of those very songs 
ruined her love life." App. at 265-66. 
 
In short, the District Court erred when it held that the 
defendants' statements were not capable of a defamatory 
meaning under Pennsylvania law. The statements had the 
tendency to lower the Tuckers in the estimation of the 
community and to deter third persons fr om associating 
with them. We must therefore examine whether the First 
Amendment poses a bar to the Tuckers' claim. 
 
II. 
 
When a public official or public figure sues for 
defamation, the First Amendment demands that the 
plaintiff prove both that the statement was false and that it 
was made with "actual malice." Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 
485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (emphasis in original omitted); New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); 
Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162-65 (1967) 
(Warren, C.J., concurring) (applying the New York Times 
standard to public figures); U.S. Healthcare v. Blue Cross of 
Greater Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914, 931 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
A. Actual malice 
 
Under New York Times v. Sullivan  and its progeny, actual 
malice means "knowledge that [the statement] was false or 
. . . reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." New 
York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80. A public figure must 
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adduce "sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that 
the defendant entertained serious doubts as to the truth of 
his publication." St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 
(1967). "[A] court ruling on a motion for summary judgment 
must be guided by the New York Times `clear and 
convincing' evidentiary standard in deter mining whether a 
genuine issue of actual malice exists--that is, whether the 
evidence presented is such that a reasonable jury might 
find that actual malice has been shown with convincing 
clarity." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 257 
(1986). 
 
1. Fischbein 
 
The Tuckers assert two grounds for holding that 
Fischbein acted with actual malice. First, the Tuckers argue 
that Fischbein, as a lawyer, should have known that a 
claim for loss of consortium may not have anything to do 
with damage to sexual relations. It follows, the Tuckers 
contend, that Fischbein was at least reckless when he told 
the press that Mrs. Tucker was trying to r ecover for injury 
to her sex life. 
 
We reject this argument. A claim for loss of consortium 
may concern damage to sexual relations and, with respect 
to the period prior to the service of the Tuckers' First 
Amended Complaint, there is no evidence that Fischbein 
was informed that Mr. Tucker's consortium claim did not 
refer to damage to sexual relations. Nor is there evidence 
from which a jury could find that Fischbein entertained 
serious doubts about the truthfulness of his statements at 
any time before the filing of the First Amended Complaint. 
Consequently, the record is insufficient to show by clear 
and convincing evidence that Fischbein was guilty during 
this period of anything more than negligence in jumping to 
the conclusion that Mr. Tucker's loss-of-consortium claim 
related, at least in part, to sex. See St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 
731; Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 290 (1971) ("The 
deliberate choice of an interpretation, though arguably 
reflecting a misconception, was not enough to create a jury 
issue of `malice' under New York T imes."). The Tuckers 
point out that Fischbein, as the representative of Shakur's 
estate, had a motive for discrediting Mrs. Tucker, but 
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circumstantial evidence of Fischbein's motive alone cannot 
satisfy the actual malice standard. 
 
The Tuckers' second argument regar ding Fischbein, 
however, does have merit. As previously noted, on August 
27, 1997, the Tuckers filed their First Amended Complaint, 
which added Fischbein as a defendant and sought millions 
of dollars in damages. The basis for adding Fischbein was 
set out in Paragraph 46, which averred that Fischbein had 
"made false and misleading statements regar ding the claim 
herein, through published statements that C. Delores Tucker 
filed suit because of a `loss of her sex life. ' " App. at 1711- 
12 (emphasis added). It is undisputed that Fischbein was 
personally served with this complaint before his interview 
with Time magazine reporter Belinda Luscombe on 
September 12, 1997.2 Nevertheless, according to 
Luscombe's deposition, Fischbein told her during this 
interview that the Tuckers were attempting to r ecover for 
damage to their sexual relationship. 
 
Based on this sequence of events, we are convinced that 
a reasonable jury could find by clear and convincing 
evidence that, at least as of the date of the service of the 
First Amended Complaint, Fischbein had actual knowledge 
that the Tuckers were not seeking to recover for damage to 
their sexual relationship. Since the First Amended 
Complaint alleged that Fischbein had defamed the Tuckers 
by stating that they were attempting to r ecover for damage 
to their sexual relations, a reasonable jury could certainly 
conclude that an attorney who read the complaint would 
understand that the Tuckers were not going to attempt to 
recover for such damage. (Indeed, it would be hard to 
interpret the First Amended Complaint any other way.) 
Fischbein states that he did not read the First Amended 
Complaint before speaking to Luscombe, but a r easonable 
jury could believe that a person who is added as a 
defendant in a multi-million dollar lawsuit is very likely to 
read the complaint shortly after receiving it in order to see 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. This argument does not apply to any statements made by Fischbein 
prior to August 27, 1997, including the comments published by the 
Philadelphia Daily News and the August 26 interview with Roberts of 
Newsweek. 
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why he or she has been sued. A reasonable jury could 
disbelieve Fischbein's story and find by clear and 
convincing evidence that Fischbein did read the First 
Amended Complaint before the interview. W e must 
therefore reverse the judgment of the District Court insofar 
as it dismissed the Tuckers' claim against Fischbein with 
regard to the statements to Luscombe. 
 
The dissent disagrees with our conclusion on this point 
because, in the dissent's view, "[t]he language of the 
Amended Complaint, in the context of the Tuckers' pr evious 
statements and actions, was insufficient to indicate a 
change in their attitude toward alleging a loss of sexual 
relations." Dissent at 24. But even if we agreed with the 
dissent's characterization of the Tuckers' prior statements,3 
the following stark facts remain: (a) the Amended 
Complaint added Fischbein as a defendant and was served 
upon him; (b) the Amended Complaint asserted that 
Fischbein had defamed the Tuckers by stating that"C. 
Delores Tucker filed suit because of a `loss of her sex life' " 
(App. at 1711-12); and (c) the Amended Complaint sought 
millions of dollars in damages. Surely a r easonable jury 
could find, by clear and convincing evidence, that Fischbein 
knew, after reading the Amended Complaint, that, whether 
or not the Tuckers had previously been seeking to recover 
for damage to their sexual relationship, they were no longer 
doing so.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The dissent seems at times to make findings of fact. For example, the 
dissent opines that "the statements made by the Tuckers and their 
attorney were deliberately cagey and equivocal so that they could, if they 
wished, introduce evidence of impotence and sexual disfunction at trial." 
Dissent at 22. This amounts to a finding of fact r egarding the intent of 
the Tuckers and their attorney, and it is the province of the trier of 
fact, 
to make such a finding. 
 
4. The dissent "find[s] it ironic that [we] believe[ ] there could be 
actual 
malice in a statement so similar to [the following statement] attributed 
to Mr. Tucker in The Philadelphia T ribune" (Dissent at 27): 
 
       Pointedly asked how the lyrics could affect his sex life, he said, 
       "That's just a brief reference [in the lawsuit] -- a small part of 
it. We 
       have to represent the situation as accurately as we can and the 
only 
       way to experience it is to have it happen to you." 
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2. Roberts and Newsweek 
 
The Tuckers' case against Roberts and Newsweek 
includes some evidence from which a reasonable jury could 
infer actual malice, but not the clear and convincing 
evidence needed to survive summary judgment. 
Accordingly, we must affirm the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Roberts and Newsweek. 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Tuckers, their attorney, Richard C. Angino, spoke with 
Roberts on August 20, 1997, six days before Roberts wrote 
"Grabbing at a Dead Star." Accor ding to Angino, he told 
Roberts in the course of this phone call that "consortium 
can mean, in some cases, sex. I said most of the time it 
doesn't and it doesn't in this case." Angino Dep., App. at 
636. 
 
Other statements in Angino's deposition sever ely weaken 
the Tuckers' position, however, and make it impossible for 
them to satisfy the clear and convincing standar d. For 
instance, when asked exactly what he said to put Roberts 
on notice that the Tuckers' claim did not involve 
impairment of sexual relations, Angino r eplied: "I said only 
in the rarest of cases would you have a count that actually 
involves sex. I'm under oath, so I cannot say to you that I 
said specifically, this case does not involve sex ." App. at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
App. at 1631 (brackets in original). 
 
At most, however, this statement may show Mr . Tucker's intent at the 
time of the article, in August 1997. It hardly establishes that the 
Tuckers 
were seeking to recover for damage to their sexual relations after they 
later filed the Amended Complaint. 
 
Moreover, the dissent's interpretation of the statement attributed to 
Mr. Tucker in the article, while certainly r easonable, is not compelled. 
Without knowing the exact question posed by the reporter (and the 
question is merely paraphrased in the article), it is not possible to rule 
out the possibility that Mr. Tucker was simply referring to his claim for 
loss of consortium, which need not necessarily have pertained to sex. In 
other words, he may have said that the loss of consortium claim was "just 
a brief reference [in the lawsuit]-- a small part of it." If evidence of 
this 
statement is admitted at trial, it will be for the trier of fact to 
interpret 
it. 
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431 (emphasis added). Actual malice requir es a plaintiff to 
establish that the defendant had a subjective  belief that the 
statement was false when made, and Angino's equivocation 
about the exact words he used defeats any hope the 
Tuckers might have of proving actual malice on the part of 
Roberts or Newsweek by clear and convincing evidence. 
Therefore, we affirm the District Court's entry of summary 
judgment in favor of those parties. 
 
3. Luscombe and Time 
 
The Tuckers set forth 24 theories under which, they 
assert, it could be found that Belinda Luscombe and Time 
acted with actual malice in connection with the"Shakur 
Booty" article of September 15, 1997. Many of these 
theories are grounded on allegations of poor journalistic 
practices--e.g., that Luscombe had a pr econceived story- 
line; that she did not follow Time's editorial guidelines; that 
she failed to conduct a thorough investigation; and that she 
copied from other stories but changed their language 
without a factual basis. As the District Court found, these 
theories of actual malice are without support in the case 
law. While we will discuss only a few of these theories 
below, we have carefully considered and r ejected all of 
them. 
 
The Supreme Court has made clear that even an extreme 
departure from professional standar ds, without more, will 
not support a finding of actual malice. See Harte-Hanks 
Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 665 
(1989). Likewise, a failure to investigate, standing alone, 
does not constitute actual malice. See St. Anant v. 
Thompson, 390 U.S. at 730-31; Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l 
Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1089 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 
The Tuckers assert that Luscombe avoided the truth by 
relying on biased sources while ignoring the Tuckers' news 
release, which explained the import of their Complaint. 
Although the Supreme Court has held that purposeful 
avoidance of the truth may support a claim of actual 
malice, the evidence here falls short. In Harte-Hanks, the 
Court held that there was sufficient evidence of actual 
malice where, among other things, a reporter failed to 
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interview a key witness to events being reported in a story, 
and the circumstances suggested that this was done for 
fear that the witnesses' statement might contradict the 
story the paper was committed to running. See  491 U.S. at 
682-83. Likewise, in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 
130 (1967), the Court found actual malice when the 
Saturday Evening Post failed to make adequate investigative 
efforts in the face of notification that the report they were 
about to print was false. Id. at 169-70. The element present 
in Harte-Hanks and Butts but lacking here is evidence from 
which a reasonable jury could infer that Luscombe doubted 
the veracity of her story. See Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 692. 
 
The Tuckers assert that the service of the First Amended 
Complaint on Time-Warner, Inc., the parent corporation of 
Time, Inc., which publishes Time magazine and employs 
Luscombe, should have put Luscombe on notice that the 
Tuckers did not seek recovery for injury to their sex life. 
This argument is far-fetched. Time-Warner, Inc., a huge 
media and entertainment conglomerate, was served 
because it was one of the original defendants due to its 
alleged connection with Interscope Records. There is no 
evidence that Luscombe or anyone else actually involved 
with the "Shakur Booty" article was given or r ead the First 
Amended Complaint, and unlike Fischbein, neither 
Luscombe nor anyone else employed by Time  magazine was 
named as a defendant in that complaint. The Tuckers have 
simply adduced no evidence (let alone clear and convincing 
evidence) that Luscombe or anyone else involved with the 
"Shakur Booty" article was aware that the Tuckers did not 
intend to include injury to their sex life as a component of 
the loss of consortium claim. 
 
We likewise see no merit in the Tuckers' ar gument that 
Luscombe and Time acted with actual malice because they 
copied other stories but then changed their language 
without a factual basis. Although the circumstances under 
which an article is changed may sometimes be enough to 
show actual malice, the present case does not fall into that 
category. This case is readily distinguishable from St. Surin 
v. Virgin Islands Daily News, Inc., 21 F.3d 1309 (3d Cir. 
1994). In St. Surin, a newspaper reporter interviewed an 
Assistant United States Attorney who confir med that St. 
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Surin was being investigated but refused to comment on 
whether charges would be brought. An editor, however, 
"changed it to read that the government expected to file 
charges against St. Surin the following week." Id. at 1318. 
We held that the evidence, viewed in the light most 
favorable to St. Surin, showed that the editor was aware of 
facts showing that her changes to the article in question 
made it false. See id. 
 
In this case, there is no comparable evidence. The 
"Shakur Booty" article was clearly derived in large part from 
previously published articles and did not change the import 
of those articles in any material way. Moreover , as 
discussed above, there is no evidence her e from which a 
reasonable jury could find that Luscombe was on notice 
that the facts related in her story wer e false. Accordingly, 
we affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment 
in favor of Time and Luscombe. 
 
B. 
 
Although the District Court based its judgment only on 
defamatory meaning and actual malice, it stated:"Counsel 
for all defendants have made various other ar guments, not 
the least of which is that the statements wer e true. By not 
commenting on them, I have not necessarily r ejected them." 
Dist. Ct. Op. at 13. On appeal, the defendants ar gue that 
the decision of the District Court may be affir med on the 
alternative ground that the Tuckers have not adduced 
sufficient evidence that any of the challenged statements 
were false when made. Although we may affir m a decision 
on an alternative ground, see, e.g. , Erie Telecomms., Inc. v. 
City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1089 n.10 (3d Cir. 1988), we 
decline to do so here. 
 
Truth is an affirmative defense under Pennsylvania law, 
see 42 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. S 8343(b)(1), but the United 
States Supreme Court has held that a publicfigure must 
bear the burden of proving falsity. See Philadelphia 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1985) 
(holding that "the common law's rule of falsity--that the 
defendant must bear the burden or proving truth--must 
similarly fall here to a constitutional r equirement that the 
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plaintiff bear the burden of showing falsity"); see also 
Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264, 274 n.49 
(3d Cir. 1980) (suggesting that Pennsylvania's practice of 
placing the burden of proving truth on the defendant is 
probably unconstitutional); Dunlap v. Philadelphia 
Newspapers, Inc., 448 A.2d 6, 13-14 (Pa. Super . 1982) 
(same). Thus, even though Fischbein's comments to 
Luscombe are capable of a defamatory meaning, and even 
though he may have uttered them with actual malice, 
Fischbein cannot be held liable unless the Tuckers can 
prove that the comments were false. 
 
We conclude that the Tuckers have pointed to proof that 
is sufficient to show, either by a preponderance or by clear 
and convincing evidence,5 that Fischbein's statements to 
Luscombe after the filing of the First Amended Complaint 
were false.6 The First Amended Complaint alleged that 
Fischbein had defamed the Tuckers when he said that they 
were trying to recover for damage to their sexual relations. 
In light of that allegation, it seems clear--and a reasonable 
jury could certainly find--that the First Amended 
Complaint itself did not seek to recover for such damage. 
(Surely a reasonable jury could find that, if the Tuckers' 
case had gone to trial under the Amended Complaint, the 
Tuckers did not intend to seek to recover both on the 
theory that Mr. Tucker suffered a loss of consortium and 
that Fischbein defamed them by asserting that they 
intended to recover for a loss of consortium.) Fischbein, 
however, supposedly told Luscombe that "this was a lawsuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The Supreme Court has explicitly declined to decide whether the 
plaintiff must prove falsity by a pr eponderance of the evidence or by 
clear and convincing evidence. See Harte-Hanks , 491 U.S. at 661 n.2 
(declining to resolve the issue, but acknowledging disagreement among 
the circuits). Compare Firestone v. Time, Inc., 460 F.2d 712, 722-23 (5th 
Cir. 1972) (Bell, C.J., concurring) (ar guing for a clear and convincing 
standard) with Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 341 (2nd Cir. 1969) 
(suggesting a preponderance of the evidence standard) and Rattray v. 
National City, 51 F.3d 793, 801 (9th Cir . 1995) (adopting Goldwater). 
 
6. Because we have held that there is not sufficient evidence that 
Fischbein acted with actual malice prior to that date, we need not and 
do not decide whether there was enough evidence to show that the 
statements he made during that period were false. 
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about emotional distress and one of things af fected were 
[sic] her sexual relationship with her husband." App. 2197. 
We hold that there was sufficient evidence of falsity to go to 
the jury. 
 
III. 
 
Finally, we hold that the District Court corr ectly denied 
the Tuckers' motions to depose in-house counsel at Time 
and Newsweek. This Court exercises plenary review over a 
discovery order regarding claims of attorney-client privilege. 
See Livingstone v. North Belle Vernon Borough, 91 F.3d 515, 
524 (3d Cir. 1996). The communications with in-house 
counsel involved here were clearly for the purpose of 
rendering legal advice and therefor e are privileged. The 
Tuckers argue that the privilege was waived because in- 
house counsel reviewed stories "in the r egular course of 
business." This argument is frivolous. That reporters 
regularly consult with in-house counsel to discuss potential 
liability for libel does not thereby deprive those 
communications of the protection of the attor ney-client 
privilege. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 
383, 394 (1981) (holding that communications between 
corporate counsel and a corporation's employees made for 
the purpose of rendering legal advice ar e protected by the 
attorney-client privilege); Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones & 
Co., 838 F.2d 1287, 1302 (D.C. Cir . 1988) ("Pre-publication 
discussions between libel counsel and editors or r eporters 
would seem to come squarely within the scope of the 
privilege as defined in Upjohn."). 
 
IV. 
 
In sum, we affirm the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment as to Time and Newsweek , but reverse in part as 
to Fischbein. We also affirm the District Court's denial of 
the Tuckers' motion to compel the deposition of the in- 
house counsel at Time and Newsweek . The case is 
remanded in part for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
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NYGAARD, Concurring and Dissenting. 
 
I agree with much of what the Majority says in its well- 
reasoned opinion for the court. I disagr ee, however, with its 
conclusion with respect to defendant Richar d Fischbein and 
therefore respectfully dissent. I conclude that the District 
Court did not err; that a reasonable jury could not find that 
Fischbein acted with actual malice when speaking to Time 
magazine reporter Belinda Luscombe; and, that summary 
judgment should be affirmed in its entir ety. 
 
I begin with the Majority's conclusion that "prior to the 
service of the Tucker's first Amended Complaint, there is no 
evidence that Fischbein was informed that Mr . Tucker's 
consortium claim did not refer to damages to sexual 
relations." I agree, but I believe that the Majority 
dramatically understates the point. There is a substantial 
amount of uncontradicted evidence suggesting that, prior to 
the filing of their Amended Complaint, the Tuckers did 
intend to include sexual damages within their loss of 
consortium claim. For clarity, I will summarize this 
evidence in list form below: 
 
       I. In his deposition, the Tuckers' attorney, Mr. Angino, 
       stipulated that at the time the suit was commenced, 
       the original complaint itself provided no indication 
       that a claim for interference with sexual relations 
       was not being pursued, and that someone r eading 
       the Tuckers' complaint might assume that it alleged 
       damage to sexual relations. (App. 566-70). In my 
       opinion, unless otherwise stated, it is axiomatic 
       that a loss of consortium claim includes a claim for 
       loss of sexual relations. 
 
       II. Mr. Angino also admitted in his deposition that 
       when the suit was initiated, he was not sur e 
       whether the Tuckers sought recovery for damage to 
       their sexual relations. (App. 576). He stated that 
       "the purpose of the consortium count was to cover 
       everything . . . every way in which Mr. Tucker was 
       affected, every way." (App. 575). The r ecord does 
       not contain any facts to the contrary. 
 
       III. The Tuckers themselves have failed to state, either 
       in their depositions or in affidavits, that they had 
 
                                20 
  
       ruled out any facet of their consortium claim at 
       the time they originally filed it. 
 
       IV. The report of Dr. Har old Mignott, Mr. Tucker's 
       physician, reveals that Mr. Tucker had"a 
       significant amount of difficulty with impotence" at 
       the same time that he suffered a "significant 
       amount of stress" resulting from the "harassment" 
       and "investigation" of both himself and his wife. 
       The report was dated approximately one month 
       before the Tuckers filed their claim for loss of 
       consortium. (App. 583). 
 
       V. On July 31, 1997, the Tuckers issued a news 
       release about the Tucker II lawsuit. 7 Nothing in the 
       press release disclaimed damages for inter ference 
       with sexual relations. (App. 2072-73). 
 
       VI. After observing the media's reaction to the 
       consortium claim, Mr. Tucker had the opportunity 
       in at least three separate interviews to clarify that 
       he and his wife were not seeking compensation for 
       injury to their sexual relations. Instead, Mr . 
       Tucker confirmed in all three interviews that 
       interference with sexual relations was indeed an 
       element of their claims. (App. 1630-31; 2142-43; 
       2145). 
 
       VII. On August 13, 1997, in an interview with 
       Philadelphia Weekly, Mr. Angino had a similar 
       opportunity to clearly state for the public r ecord 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The complaint in Tucker II is itself a confusing farrago of missteps 
and 
errors. Appellants' attorney never discussed the loss of consortium claim 
with the Tuckers. (App. 518). The complaint was drafted by a law 
student. It misrepresented one song by taking "snippets of words from 
actual lyrics, words that are separated by many, many verses and 
run[ning] them together as if they are a continuous statement," creating 
what appellants' attorney now admits was "a gross and deliberate 
misrepresentation." (App. 534). The appellant's attorney neither listened 
to nor read the lyrics of the song that he alleges was defamatory. He 
never conducted a fact check of any of the critical allegations in the 
complaint. Indeed, he did not even sign it, nor is it clear from the 
record 
that he even read the final draft. His wife (who is not an attorney) 
signed 
it for him. 
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       that the Tuckers were foregoing any claims 
       stemming from interference with sexual relations. 
       However, Mr. Angino failed to do so. Instead, he 
       stated that loss of consortium "is a standar d 
       addition to lawsuits of this type and refers to all 
       aspects of the marital relationship, not 
       necessarily sex." (App. 2148-49) (my emphasis). 
 
       VIII. On August 21, 1997, the Tuckers issued yet 
       another press release. It again failed to disavow 
       any claim arising out of Mr. Tucker's impotency 
       or injury to the Tuckers' sexual relationship. 
       Instead, the release confirmed the existence of 
       such a claim and expressed the Tuckers' 
       frustration that too much of the media's 
       attention was focused on that aspect of the case: 
       " `All the media gleefully jumped on the so-called 
       sex part in the suit that called attention to loss 
       of consortium, which was put in there by my 
       husband Bill, not by me,' [Mrs. Tucker] added, 
       obviously nettled." (App. 464). 
 
       IX. The Tuckers have admitted that neither they, nor 
       Mr. Angino, nor anyone on their behalf, ever called 
       Fischbein, at any time, to correct his 
       misunderstanding of the Tuckers' loss of 
       consortium claim. (App. 571, 1968). 
 
The Tuckers have failed to provide any evidence, other than 
the language in their Amended Complaint, to suggest that 
they did not intend to claim loss of sexual r elations. 
Instead, it is obvious to me that the statements made by 
the Tuckers and their attorney were deliberately cagey and 
equivocal so that they could, if they wished, intr oduce 
evidence of impotence and sexual dysfunction at trial.8 
 
In spite of substantial evidence to the contrary, the 
Tuckers still claim that all of Fischbein's statements were 
made with actual malice; that is, with the "knowledge that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Another way of approaching this issue is to ask whether at trial, given 
the general loss of consortium that the Tuckers originally alleged, it 
would have been proper for the District Court to allow introduction of 
evidence of Mr. Tucker's sexual dysfunction. The answer clearly is yes. 
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[they were] false or with reckless disregard of whether [they 
were] false or not." New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 
279-80. According to the Majority, the Tuckers present two 
independent arguments in support of their position. 
Although I remain unconvinced that they clearly articulate 
even one, I will, for the sake of discussion, addr ess both 
arguments in turn. 
 
First, the Tuckers seem to suggest that Fischbein's legal 
training put him on notice that loss of consortium does not 
always imply harm to sexual relations. According to their 
brief: 
 
       Fischbein, who is a lawyer who knows the definition of 
       consortium, knew at the time that he talked to the Los 
       Angeles Times and the Philadelphia News and all of the 
       other newspapers, including Time and Newsweek, that 
       Mrs. Tucker did not claim in the Tucker I complaint 
       that her sex life had been destroyed by the lewd lyrics 
       of Tupac Shakur . . . Certainly a jury could find that 
       Mr. Fischbein's uttering his sexual spin thr oughout 
       this period constituted malice as defined by the 
       Supreme Court. 
 
(Appellants' Br. at 46-47). The Majority quickly dismisses 
this argument, and there is no need to consider it further, 
except that I question the Majority's suggestion that 
Fischbein may have been negligent during the period prior 
to the filing of the Amended Complaint. Again, I emphasize 
that all of the evidence before the court indicates that the 
Tuckers, at least originally, did intend to pursue damages 
for loss of sexual relations. It is har d for me to imagine how 
Fischbein may have been negligent in any way. 
 
Until this point, my concerns with the Majority's opinion 
have been fairly minor. I strongly disagree, however, with its 
disposition of the Tuckers' second main argument. 
According to the Majority, the Amended Complaint clearly 
disavowed any intent to pursue damages for loss of sexual 
relations. As such, a jury could find that Fischbein had 
read the complaint, and that his subsequent comments to 
Time magazine constituted actual malice.9 Although I 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. I agree with the Majority that a r easonable jury could find, in light 
of 
the high stakes surrounding the law suit, that Fischbein had read the 
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readily admit that this position is mor e compelling than the 
Tuckers' first argument, I still cannot agr ee. The language 
of the Amended Complaint, by itself, is simply insufficient 
to convince a reasonable jury, under a clear and convincing 
evidence standard, that Fischbein had actual knowledge 
that the Tuckers were not seeking to recover damages for 
loss of sexual relations 
 
Before explaining my position, I want to be absolutely 
clear about two points. First, I agree with the Majority that, 
other than the Amended Complaint, "there is no evidence" 
that Fischbein acted with actual malice.10  Thus, even under 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Amended Complaint prior to his interview with T ime. I disagree, however, 
with the Majority's conclusory statement that "it would be hard to 
interpret the First Amended Complaint any other way." In light of the 
Tucker's previous statements, and their penchant for ambiguity, I do not 
believe that a reasonable jury could establish actual malice based solely 
upon the Tuckers' five line paragraph. 
10. The Tuckers contend that they indicated, thr ough personal 
interviews and statements by their attorney, that they did not intend to 
allege loss of sexual relations. This is simply not supported by the 
record. For example, in their Second Amended Complaint, they claim 
that their attorney told a Newsweek Reporter"unequivocally that the 
complaint did not allege . . . that the actions of Defendants related in 
the 
[original] complaint had anything to do with their sex life." (App. 24). 
Their attorney's signature appears on this complaint. During his 
deposition, however, Mr. Angino admitted that, "I said only in the rarest 
of cases would you have a count that actually involves sex. I'm under 
oath, so I cannot say to you that I said specifically, this case does not 
involve sex." (App. 646). This is but one of many examples where The 
Tuckers were vague and ambiguous in their public statements and in 
their declarations to this Court. The Tuckers also argue that the 
Webster's dictionary definition of consortium supports their case. (App. 
25). I did a quick check to verify this claim. Using the Internet (see 
www.dictionary.com, accessible via www.websters.com), I obtained the 
following definition of consortium: 
 
       3. Law. The right of a spouse to the company of, help of, affection 
       of, and sexual relations with his or her mate. 
 
Unless this definition has changed radically in the past three years, 
Webster's cuts strongly against  the Tuckers. In sum, none of this 
"evidence" is sufficient to persuade a r easonable jury that any of the 
defendants acted with actual malice in "misinterpreting" the Tuckers' 
claims. 
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the Majority's decision, the Tuckers' entir e claim rests solely 
upon the language in the Amended Complaint. As the 
Tuckers admit in their brief, only two paragraphs, out of 
the seventy-one contained in the complaint, addr ess the 
question of sexual relations: 
 
       45. Defendant [Fischbein] has continued to defame 
       and harass plaintiff by holding her up in a false 
       light even after the complaint in this matter was 
       filed on June 21, 1997. 
 
       46. Defendant Fischbein made false and misleading 
       statements regarding the claim [asserted in the 
       original complaint], through published statements 
       that C. Delores Tucker filed suit because of a 
       "loss of her sex life." The statement was untrue, 
       and defendant Attorney Fischbein should have 
       known it was untrue. 
 
(App. 1711-12). Second, the Tuckers filed the Amended 
Complaint on August 27, 1997. The only statements made 
by Fischbein after that date, and thus the only potentially 
actionable comments, were those to T ime magazine reporter 
Belinda Luscombe. I agree with the Majority that all other 
comments were made without actual malice. Thus, the 
question over which the Majority and I disagr ee is a fairly 
narrow one, and I would characterize it in the following 
manner: After all of the Tuckers' actions and comments to 
the contrary, did the language in the Amended Complaint 
sufficiently clarify the parameters of the loss of consortium 
claim so that a reasonable jury could find that Fischbein's 
comments to Time magazine were made with a reckless 
disregard for the truth? I strongly believe the answer is no. 
 
The language of the Amended Complaint, in the context 
of the Tuckers' previous statements and actions, was 
insufficient to indicate a change in their attitude toward 
alleging a loss of sexual relations. In spite of all the media 
attention, and all the harm that it supposedly caused, the 
complaint failed to contain a simple, categorical statement 
that the Tuckers were foregoing any claim for interference 
with sexual relations. Instead, it continued to allege that 
Mr. Tucker had "suffered a loss of . . . consortium," using 
the very same language that was contained in the original 
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Tucker II complaint. (App. 1713). The only addition was a 
short paragraph stating that Mrs. Tucker did not file the 
original suit because of a loss of sexual relations. It said 
nothing about Mr. Tucker, who had originally filed the loss 
of consortium claim. And, as their own attor ney testified, 
"when you damage one spouse, you damage the other 
spouse in each and every way." (App. 566). My conclusion 
is underscored by the fact that one month later , and 
simultaneous with the filing of the complaint at issue in 
this appeal, the Tuckers filed a Second Amended Complaint 
to Tucker II, in which they unequivocally stated, for the first 
time, that they were not seeking damages for interference 
with sexual relations. This came far too late to serve as an 
effective form of notice to Fischbein. 11 
 
Even if the language of the complaint did clearly 
communicate the Tuckers' position, as the Majority so 
holds, it is not clear to me that this evidence by itself is 
enough to support a jury's finding of actual malice. I am 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. With regard to the gravamen of this Second Amended Complaint, 
plaintiffs' attorney responded as follows in his deposition: 
 
       Q. And why did you feel there was a need to have -- to file a 
       Second Amended Complaint? 
 
       A. I couldn't believe how dense the defense wer e. 
 
       Q. And in the Second Amended Complaint, you placed a dictionary 
       definition of consortium; is that correct? 
 
       A. That was a joke. It was really a joke. 
 
       Q. Well, wait a minute, sir. Ar e you saying that you were 
       perpetrating a joke in a Federal Court Complaint; is that what 
       you are telling me? 
 
       A. That's what I'm telling you. I said if I had to actually give 
you a 
       dictionary definition. . . 
 
       Q. So you were -- you were playing ar ound a little bit in a 
Federal 
       Court Complaint; is that correct? 
 
       A. I was saying look consortium means this. 
 
       Q. So you were playing around a little bit. 
 
       A. You -- you might say that. 
 
App. 829-30. 
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deeply troubled by the fact that, in spite of intense media 
scrutiny and its concomitant pressures, the Tuckers never 
publicly clarified the nature of their suit or contacted 
Fischbein directly, until they filed the complaint in this 
case. In short, they did nothing to curb public scrutiny 
other than amend their original complaint to include new 
claims. After the numerous public comments and 
accusations by the Tuckers, it is simply unr easonable to 
require Fischbein to infer solely fr om the language of the 
Amended Complaint that the Tuckers had changed their 
position. 
 
Finally, even if the Amended Complaint by itself was 
enough to support a jury finding of actual malice, I do not 
believe that Fischbein's comments were r eckless. As 
previously discussed, the only comments made subsequent 
to the filing of the Amended Complaint wer e those to Time 
magazine on September 12, 1997. According to Luscombe's 
uncontradicted notes and testimony, Fischbein stated only 
that Tucker II "was brought for emotional distress and that 
part of that was that her sexual relationship with her 
husband was affected." (App. 2197). T ime magazine did not 
quote Fischbein, and Luscombe's article relied heavily upon 
seven previous articles, all published in r espected sources 
from Rolling Stone to The W ashington Post prior to the filing 
of the Amended Complaint. I find it ironic that the Majority 
believes there could be actual malice in a statement so 
similar to one attributed to Mr. Tucker in The Philadelphia 
Tribune (my emphasis): 
 
       Pointedly asked how the lyrics could affect his sex life, 
       he said, `That's just a brief reference[in the lawsuit] - 
       a small part of it. We have to r epresent the situation as 
       accurately as we can and the only way to experience it 
       is to have it happen to you.' 
 
As previously discussed, in addition to this statement, there 
is a substantial amount of evidence that indicates that the 
Tuckers originally did bring their suit, at least in part, to 
recover for loss of sexual relations. Regardless of whether 
they later changed their position, a literal r eading of 
Fischbein's statement to Time r eveals no "reckless 
disregard for the truth." 
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The record demonstrates that Fischbein, at the time of 
his conversation with Time magazine, (1) was not aware 
that the Tuckers intended to relinquish their claims for 
interference with sexual relations, and (2) even if he was, 
his comments were not reckless. As a r esult, I conclude 
that the Tuckers cannot meet their burden of 
demonstrating facts sufficient to show that Fischbein made 
any statements that he suspected were false. As such, I 
would affirm the grant of summary judgment in its entirety. 
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